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In this paper, I take up the theory of beings of reason from Rodrigo de Arriaga 
SJ (1592–1667) and provide some context for preliminary assessment of its 
signifi cance. In fi ve sections I analyse his views about the nature, the exist-
ence, causes, God’s relation to, and the division of beings of reason. We will 
see that in many ways Arriaga’s discussion is just derived from the original 
ideas of Pedro Hurtado de Mendoza SJ (1578–1641), who is assumed to be 
his philosophy teacher in Valladolid, and who placed the concept of error at 
ͩ Arriaga was born in Logroño, Spain. In ͩͮͨͮ he joined the Jesuits and studied in Salamanca and 
Valladolid. In ͩͮͪͭ he settled in Prague where he spent the rest of his life. For many years he 
was the Rector of the Charles-Ferdinand University in Prague. He also published an (almost) 
complete series of theological textbooks, Disputationes theologicae (ͩͮͬͫ–ͩͮͭͭ). In Bohemia, 
as it was shown by Stanislav Sousedík, he was the focal thinker who prompted great local de-
velopment of philosophy and theology at the time. But he was well-known not only in Bohemia 
and within scholastic circles but world-wide. “Pierre Bayle calls him ǰrefi ned and penetratingǱ, 
and ǰa Genius’.” (The Dictionary Historical and Critical: The Second Edition. London, Knapton et 
al. ͩͯͫͬ, p. ͭͨͮ; the fi rst French edition was published in ͩͮͱͯ). For pioneering work on Arriaga, 
see Eschweiler, K., Roderigo de Arriaga. Spanische Forschungen der Görresgesellschaft, ͫ, ͩͱͫͩ, 
p. ͪͭͫ–ͪͰͮ. For the groundbreaking collective monograph on various aspects of Arriaga’s life 
thought, see Saxlová, T. – Sousedík, S., Rodrigo de Arriaga († ͭͲͲͳ), Philosoph und Theologe. 
Praha, Karolinum ͩͱͱͰ. (Reviewed by Novotný, D. D., Rodrigo de Arriaga († ͩͮͮͯ), Philosoph 
und Theologe. Acta Commeniana, ͩͬ, ͪͨͨͨ, p. ͪͫͱ–ͪͬͫ). Thanks to Bayle and Sousedík, there 
is a modest but continuous interest in Arriaga, see e.g. Armogathe, Jean-Robert. Dubium Per-
fectissimum: The Skepticism of the “Subtle Arriaga”. In: Maia Neto, J. R. (ed.), Skepticism in 
Renaissance and post-Renaissance thought: New interpretations. Amherst, NY, Humanity Books, 
ͪͨͨͬ, p. ͩͨͯ–ͩͪͩ. 
ͪ Arriaga’s views on beings of reason did not remain unnoticed in modern scholarship: Kobush, 
T., Sein und Sprache: Historische Grundlegung einer Ontologie der Sprache. Brill, Leiden ͩͱͰͯ, 
p. ͪͱͮ; Kobush, T., Arriagas Lehre vom “Gedankending”. In: Saxlová, T. – Sousedík, S., Rodri-
go de Arriaga († ͭͲͲͳ), op. cit., p. ͩͪͫ–ͩͬͨ. Doyle, J., Beings of Reason and Imagination. In: On 
the Borders of Being and Knowing: Some Late Scholastic Thoughts on Supertranscendental Being. 
Ed. V. M. Salas. Leuven, Leuven University Press ͪͨͩͪ, p. ͩͭͩ–ͩͮͯ. Millán-Puelles, A., The Theory 
of Pure Object. Transl. J. García-Gomez. Heidelberg, Universitätsverlag C. Winter ͩͱͱͮ, p. ͯͰͰ.
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the centre of the theory. Arriaga, however, also defends some non-standard 
views of his own, such as the claim that all human powers (not just the intel-
lect but senses as well), can make beings of reason. In the revised edition 
of his major work he also adds some interesting polemical passages that 
indicate the emergence of the reductionist (or we might say eliminativist) 
approach to beings of reason, according to which they are not distinct from 
real beings but reducible to them. 
Arriaga deals with beings of reason in his Cursus philosophicus, a univer-
sity textbook containing material covering the usual three-year Jesuit philo-
sophical curriculum, i.e. Summulae, Logica, Physica, De coelo, De generatione, 
De anima, and Metaphysica (ethics was taught within moral theology).  ere 
are several editions of Arriaga’s Cursus philosophicus.  e fi rst came out in 
Antwerp in 1632, followed by several editions in Paris and Lyon, and the last, 
revised and expanded, was published more than thirty years later, shortly 
after Arriaga’s death in Lyon in 1669. Arriaga’s Cursus is one of the many 
comprehensive philosophy textbooks published in the Baroque era.  e 
genre seems to be established by Hurtado with his Universa philosophia, fi rst 
published as Disputationes a summulis ad metaphysicam in 1615. Many Jesuit 
and non-Jesuit professors of theology followed the trend and wrote text-
books presenting and defending various nuanced competing views, within 
the generally acknowledged, although shifting, common ground.
ͫ In this he went against the classical scholastic theory in which beings of reason played various 
indispensable positive roles in our cognition of relations and absences. See Novotný, D. D., The 
Non-Signifi cance of Suárez’s Theory of Beings of Reason: A Lesson from Hurtado. In: Novák, 
L. (ed.), Suárez’s Metaphysics in Its Historical and Systematic Context. Berlin, Walter de Gruyter, 
ͪͨͩͬ, p. ͩͰͫ–ͪͨͰ. Sven K. Knebel tracks Hurtado’s construal of beings of reason in terms of 
errors to Vázquez (Erkenntnistheoretisches aus dem Nachlass des Jesuitengenerals Tirso Gonzáles 
de Santalla (ͭͲͮͰ–ͭͳͬͱ), Amsterdam, Grüner ͪͨͩͩ, p. ͩͪͭ – hereinafter referred to as Erkenntnis-
theoretisches).
ͬ Arriaga, R., Cursus philosophicus. Anverpiae, Balthasaris Moreti ͩͮͫͪ; Arriaga, R., Cursus philo-
sophicus: iam noviter maxima ex parte auctus, et illustratus, et a variis obiectionibus liberatus, 
necnon a mendis expurgatus. Lugduni, Ioannis Antonii Huguetan et Guillielmi Barbier ͩͮͮͱ. 
(In the Prolog of the last edition Arriaga mentions “six or seven” preceding editions.)
ͭ One may also give credit for pioneering this genre to Eustache de Saint-Paul (O.Cist.) (ͩͭͯͫ–
ͩͮͬͨ) for his Summa Philosophiae Quadripartita published in ͩͮͨͱ. However, this work and its 
small octavo volumes is somewhat too modest when compared to the impressive quartos or 
folios of Hurtado, Arriaga and others. Eustachius also lacks ambition to engage in debates over 
subtle points with his professional colleagues, which is what the best authors in the “big text-
book” genre aspired to do, in spite of their concern for pedagogical brevity, simplicity and 
“uniformity of doctrine”. See also Knebel, S. K., Erkenntnistheoretisches, op. cit., p. ͭͨ ff , who 
considers Arriaga to be the founder of the genre: “Historisch angemessen wäre es charakte-
risiert als seine freie Variation auf den Philosophiekurs des Rodrigo de Arriaga…; denn dieser 
bildet die Vorlage.” 
ͮ The research of these textbooks has been unfortunately neglected in spite of their being of 
great historical and perhaps even systematic philosophical interest. Within the pages of these 
textbooks the dialectics of innovation and conservation unfolded, addictive to its participants, 
ͩͪͨ  Daniel D. Novotný
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Beings of reason are systematically treated by Arriaga on two occasions, 
fi rst briefl y in Logica	 and then extensively in Metaphysica Disputatio 7.  e 
main discussion is given in the latter, since in his view the being of reason is 
not the object of logic, as the  omists hold.
  e Disputation is structured 
around the following questions:
Section 1: What is the being of reason? 
Section 2: Whether there is the being of reason? 
  Subsection 1:  ere is the being of reason. 
  Subsection 2: Solution to the objections. 
Section 3: What potencies make the being of reason and how? 
  Subsection 1:  e being of reason is made by every false act. 
  Subsection 2: Which being of reason is made by internal senses? 
   Subsection 3: What about the external senses and the simple 
        apprehension? 
Section 4: Whether God makes the being of reason? 
Section 5: How many [kinds of] the being of reason are there?
Between the editions, Arriaga did not substantially modify his views, 
although, as I have already said, he added some interesting polemical 
passages.  e structure of the Disputation remained identical in both 
editions. Only the number of the Disputation changed from 6 in the original 
to 7 in the revised edition as the original Disputation 4 was divided into two, 
On substance and On subsistence. In fi ve sections of this paper I shall mostly 
follow Arriaga’s own arrangement of the text.
with newly discovered sub-topics and ever more complex distinctions constantly emerging as 
one textbook succeeded another. Although this tradition relies heavily on older scholastic texts 
and may thus be dismissed as a mere “footnote” one may also see in it the climax of previous 
scholastic thought. The works of this tradition implement strictly systematic ordering, revel in 
details and indexing, summarize and arbitrate centuries old debates. Some topics are treated 
with unsurpassed systematicity and comprehensiveness. Though early modern philosophy re-
volted against this tradition and attempted to ignore or abandon it, it was not quite possible 
to do so and its concepts, views and methods left their non-negligible traces. (This, however, 
does not apply with respect to all topics. There is, for instance, a striking contrast concerning 
the prominence of the topic of ens rationis among the scholastics and disregard of it among 
the non-scholastics of the time, see Knebel, ibid., p. ͯͱ.) For excellent essays on post-medieval 
scholastic textbook tradition see Blum, P. R., Studies on Early Modern Aristotelianism. Leiden, 
Brill ͪͨͩͪ.
ͯ Arriaga, R., Cursus philosophicus … expurgatus, ͩ ͮͮͱ, op. cit., p. ͮ ͪ–ͮͬ. (Logica d. ͪ , s. ͪ , n. ͩ ͯ-ͪͰ).
Ͱ Beings of reason are not the object of logic when understood in the appropriate sense as that 
which does not have esse a parte rei but only a fi ctione intellectu. See Arriaga, ibid. Hurtado 
deals with the question in a more detailed way in Universa philosophia Lugduni, Sumpt. Ludovici 
Prost ͩͮͪͬ, p. ͭͩ–ͭͯ. For the methodological question of the place of beings of reason in meta-
physics, see Kobush, T., Arriagas Lehre vom “Gedankending”, op. cit., p. ͩͪͫ ff .
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1. Nature: what is the being of reason? 
Arriaga opens his discussion of the nature of being of reason in section 1 by 
distinguishing various meanings of the term ‘ens rationis’, continues with 
polemics against “the  omists” and concludes with the defi nition. Let me in 
turn deal with these topics.
With respect to the meaning of the term ‘ens rationis’ Arriaga distin-
guishes between the being of reason as the act of the intellect, which is 
a real being, and as that “which has no real being but is merely contrived 
(tantum fi ctum) by the intellect”, which is not a real being and is the proper 
topic of the inquiry. Further on, Arriaga also applies the terms “subjective” 
for the act and “objective” for the object of the act.  e two are distinct 
even when we speak of non-real objects, i.e. beings of reason. In all of these 
claims Arriaga simply follows Hurtado who, unlike Ockham in his late act-
only theory, does not completely abandon act/object distinction.
Arriaga next criticizes “the  omists” who hold that a being of reason 
is that which posits nothing intrinsic into the things; we may call this the 
extrinsic denomination view of beings of reason. From this it would follow 
that denominations of being known, genus, species, etc. and in fact all extrinsic 
denominations are beings of reason. Although many recent thinkers, Arriaga 
points out, disagree with this, they should not complain about the incoher-
ency of the  omistic view, because if the being of reason taken “strictly” is 
something real which posits nothing intrinsic into the denominated subject, 
which is what they seem to hold, then, of course, all extrinsic denomina-
tions are beings of reason. But then they are both real and of reason because 
ͱ Arriaga, R., Cursus philosophicus … expurgatus, ͩͮͮͱ, op. cit., p. ͩͨͨͰ (Metaphysica d. ͯ, s. ͩ, 
n. ͩ).
ͩͨ The distinction between subjective/objective can be traced to Scotus, see Novák, L., Scire Deum 
esse. Scotův důkaz Boží existence jako vrcholný výkon metafyziky jakožto aristotelské vědy. Pra-
ha, Kalich ͪͨͩͩ, p. ͩͨͪ–ͩͩͬ.
ͩͩ “…solum possunt esse entia rationis obiecta actuum, non vero actus ipsi cognoscentes ipsa 
obeicta, nec denominationes actibus.” Arriaga, R., Cursus philosophicus … expurgatus, ͩͮͮͱ, 
op. cit., p. ͩͨͨͱ (d. ͯ, s. ͩ, n. ͮ-ͯ).
ͩͪ For Hurtado’s adaptation of Ockham’s thought see Caruso, E., Pedro Hurtado de Mendoza e la 
rinascita del nominalismo nella Scolastica del Seicento. Firenze, La Nuova Italia ͩͱͯͱ, and Heider, 
D., Pedro Hurtado de Mendoza’s (Mis)interpretation of Aquinas. In: Sgarbi, M. (ed.), Francisco 
Suárez and his legacy: The impact of Suárezian metaphysics and epistemology on modern philoso-
phy. Milan, Vita e pensiero ͪͨͩͨ.
ͩͫ The view was inspired by Aquinas’s remark “quod ens rationis dicitur, quod cum in re nihil 
ponat, et in se non sit ens, formatur tamen seu accipitur ut ens in ratione.” Aquinas, T., Summa 
Theologiae I, q. ͩͮ, a. ͫ, ad ͪ.
ͩͬ Ibid., p. ͩͨͨͰ (d. ͯ, s. ͩ, n. ͩ).
ͩͭ “Si enim Thomistae per ens rationis praecise intelligant (ut videntur intelligere) id quod licet 
in se sit reale, nihil tamen ponit intrinsecum in subiecto denominato, fateor, verissime, eos 
ͩͪͪ  Daniel D. Novotný
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cognition is something real. For instance, that I know Peter is something 
real and hence also that Peter is known by me. Since cognition posits nothing 
intrinsic into Peter, being known is a being of reason, as well as some extrinsic 
real being. We need another anti- omistic argument: Either bite the bullet, 
and acknowledge that all extrinsic denominations, including e.g. being to the 
right of something, are beings of reason, or give up the claim that a being of 
reason is that which posits nothing intrinsic into the things.	  e fi rst horn 
of the dilemma is completely out of step with communis sententia. Moreover, 
by this doctrine the statement “John is known by me” would make a fi ction, 
whereas “I know John” would not; the two statements, however, diff er only 
verbally and otherwise are identical.
 It is true, Arriaga continues, that if we 
consider being known as something intrinsic to John, it is a being of reason 
since we conceive it diff erently than it is. But when we say “John is known” we 
do not hereby claim that being known is intrinsic to him. So we are left with 
the second horn of the dilemma, namely to give up the slogan that a being 
of reason is that which posits nothing intrinsic into the things. Beings of 
reason are not extrinsic denominations as such. Some other defi nition must 
be found.
docere, esse cognitum, genus, speciem, etc. esse entia rationis, neque eis hoc possumus 
negare, et frustra tunc arguitur.” Ibid., p. ͩͨͨͰ (d. ͯ, s. ͩ, n. ͪ).
ͩͮ Ibid., p. ͩͨͨͰ (d. ͯ, s. ͩ, n. ͪ).
ͩͯ Ibid., p. ͩͨͨͰ (d. ͯ, s. ͩ, n. ͪ-ͫ).
ͩͰ “…Ioannem esse a me cognitum, … est idem ac me cognoscere Ioannem, solumque diff erunt 
penes voces activam et passivam; … sed me cognoscere Ioannem, est aliquid reale … ergo et 
Ioannem cognosci a me, erit aliquid reale, licet non intrinsecum Ioanni.” Ibid., p. ͩͨͨͰ (d. ͯ, s. ͩ, 
n. ͫ).
ͩͱ “Fateor, si id iudicaretur ut quid intrinsecum Ioanni, tunc esset quid fi ctum, quia cognoscere-
tur aliter ac est in se, hoc autem non sit eo quod dicam illum esse cognitum, ergo non est quid 
fi ctum, ergo neque ens rationis in hoc sensu.” Ibid., p. ͩͨͨͰ (d. ͯ, s. ͩ, n. ͫ-ͬ). 
ͪͨ Arriaga also identifi es a somewhat diff erent view according to which in all denominations 
something fi ctitious is “admixed.” He dismisses this view quickly by appealing to counter-
example denominations such as being created that do not involve any fi ction (fi ctum). Arriaga, 
R., Cursus philosophicus … expurgatus, op. cit., p. ͩͨͨͱ (d. ͯ, s. ͩ, n. ͮ). This mixed view was held 
by John of St. Thomas OP (ͩͭͰͱ–ͩͮͬͬ) who argues that in extrinsic denominations something 
real and of reason “concurs”, see Cursus philosophicus thomisticus … nunc primum in Germania 
excusus … et ex eiusdem Magistri doctrina illustratus per Thomam de Sarria, Sumpt. Constan-
tini Münich, Coloniae Agrippinae, ͩͮͫͰ, p. ͫͬ (The doctrine is adopted by Gredt, J., Elementa 
philosophiae Aristo telico-thomisticae. Ed. E. Zenzen. Herder, Barcinone ͩͱͮͱ, p. ͩͪͬ). The mixed 
view of extrinsic denominations seems to correspond to the resultant extrinsic denomination 
view of beings of reason, according to which they are just the (necessitated) result of extrinsic 
denominations. See also Novotný, D. D., Rubio and Suárez: A Comparative Study on the Nature 
of Entia rationis. In: Čemus, P. (ed.), Bohemia Jesuitica ͭ ͱͱͲ–ͮͬͬͲ. Praha, Karolinum ͪ ͨͩͨ, p. ͬ Ͱͬ, 
and Novotný, D. D., Ens rationis from Suárez to Caramuel. New York, Fordham ͪͨͩͫ, p. ͩͬͱ–ͩͭͨ, 
incl. notes. 
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Arriaga’s criticism of the  omists is just a radical simplifi cation of 
Hurtado’s intricate arguments. Who are these  omists on Arriaga’s 
target? In Logica he approvingly adopts the list of Hurtado who gives us the 
following names: Domingo de Soto OP (1494–1560), Francisco Toledo SJ 
(1533–1596), Diego Más OP (1553–1608), Antonio Rubio SJ (1548–1615) 
and “many others who hold this view with” Durand de Saint-Pourçain OP 
(c. 1275–1334).	  e selection of names is somewhat idiosyncratic, as well 
as the label “the  omists”. Some important proponents of the view should 
be included, such as Pedro da Fonseca SJ (1528–1599)
, Gabriel Vázquez SJ 
(1549–1604), and Francisco de Araújo OP (1580–1664). It should also be 
noted that Arriaga does not distinguish between the views that beings of 
reason as extrinsic denominations are real (probably Durand and others) 
and that as extrinsic denominations they are non-real (probably Vázquez, 
Araújo and others).  e latter thinkers would not subscribe to the reduc-
ͪͩ Hurtado, P., Universa philosophia, op. cit., p. ͭͩ–ͭͯ (in Logic) and p. ͱͬͪ–ͱͭͪ (in metaphy-
sics). For Hurtado’s argumentation in metaphysics, see briefl y Novotný, D. D., The Historical 
Non-Signi fi cance of Suárez’s Theory, op. cit., p. ͩͰͭ–ͩͰͰ.
ͪͪ Hurtado, P., Universa philosophia, op. cit., p. ͮͪ (in logic) and p. ͱͬͪ (in metaphysics).
ͪͫ Soto, D., In Porphyrii Isagogen, Aristotelis Categorias, librosque de Demonstratione Absolutissima 
Commentaria. Venetiis, Dominici Guerraei ͩͭͰͯ, p. ͪͨ–ͪͬ.
ͪͬ Toletus, F., Commentaria in universam Aristotelis logicam. In: Opera omnia philosophica. 
Hildesheim, Georg Olms ͩͱͰͭ [ͩͩͭͯͪ, Rome], p. ͩͭ–ͩͰ, draws heavily on Soto).
ͪͭ Masius, D., Commentaria in Porphyrium et universam Aristotelis Logicam, una cum quaestioni-
bus, qua a gravissimi viris agitari solent tomi duo, Coloniae ͩͮͩͯ [ͩͩͭͱͪ, Valencia], Sumpt. Conradi 
Burgenii, p. ͬͨ.
ͪͮ Ruvius, A., Commentarii in universam Aristotelis dialecticam, magnam et parvam, una cum dubiis 
et quaestionibus hac tempestate circa utramque agitari solitis, Compluti, Ex. Off . Iusti Sanchez 
Crespo, ͩͮͨͫ, p. ͪͮͮ–ͪͯͰ. See Novotný, D. D., Rubio and Suárez: A Comparative Study on the 
Nature of Entia rationis. In: Čemus, P. (ed.), Bohemia Jesuitica ͭͱͱͲ–ͮͬͬͲ, op. cit., p. ͬͯͯ–ͬͱͨ. 
Hurtado discusses Rubio’s views but confesses that they are obscure to him, Universa Philoso-
phia, op. cit., p. ͱͬͫ.
ͪͯ Durandus a Sancto Porciano, Petri Lombardi Sententias Theologicas Commentariorum libri IIII, 
Venetiis, Ex Typ. Guerraea, p. ͮͮa (d. ͩͱ, q. ͭ, n. ͯ). 
ͪͰ Fonseca, P., In Metaphysicorum Aristotelis Stagiritae Libros, vol. ͪ, Coloniae, Sumpt. Lazari 
Zetzneri, ͩͮͩͭ [ͩͩͭͰͱ, Rome], p. ͬͮͭ–ͬͮͰ. He seems to subscribe to the view in section ͬ (l. ͭ, 
c. ͯ, q. ͮ) but the following section ͭ takes a diff erent perspective. 
ͪͱ Vázquez, G., Commentariorum ac Disputationum in Primam Partem … tomus secundus … editio 
novissima, Apud Petrum et Ioannem Belleros, Antwerpiae ͩͮͪͭ, p. ͫͪ (d. ͩͩͭ, c. ͪ, n. ͪ).
ͫͨ Araújo justifi es the view by an appeal to Cambridge changes: “experientia constat, multas de-
nominationes advenire subiectis de novo et amoveri ab illis absque illarum mutatione, sed nihil 
reale adinvenit aut amovetur … ergo dicendum est illas denominationes esse aliquid rationis.” 
Araújo, F., Commentariorum in Universam Aristotelis Metaphysicam, Ex. Off . Ioannis Baptistae 
Varesii, Burgis et Salmanticae, ͩͮͩͯ, p. ͫͪͭ. For other aspects of Araújo’s theory of beings of 
reason, see Novotný, D. D., Twenty Years After Suárez. Francisco de Araújo on the Nature, Ex-
istence, and Causes of Entia rationis. In: Salas, V. (ed.), Hircocervi and Other Metaphysical Won-
ders: Essays in Honor of John P. Doyle. Milwaukee, Marquette University Press ͪͨͩͫ. Araújo’s 
work was intended as a response to the Jesuit challenge in metaphysics as his Prolog and Hur-
tado’s reply to it shows. (Hurtado, P., Universa Philosophia, op. cit., p. ͯͨͪ–ͯͨͫ.)
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tionist view that “taken precisely” beings of reason are “real in themselves”. 
(Redu ctionism, i.e. the view that beings of reason are real beings, will come 
up again below, in the discussion of self-contradictory beings.)
Having rejected the extrinsic denomination view Arriaga concludes that 
a being of reason is to be defi ned as “that which has merely objective being 
in the intellect”.  is defi nition, made popular by Suárez, became standard 
in the Jesuit order, and in 1653 even mandatory, although its interpreta-
tion continued to be interpreted in widely diff erent senses. An example 
of a being of reason that Arriaga gives at this point already indicates that 
his interpretation draws on Hurtado – “the man is irrational”.  e irrational 
man has no being in reality (a parte rei) but he is conceived as having, hence 
he has only objective being in the intellect and is a fi ctitious being of reason 
(ens rationis fi ctum). 
Further details of Arriaga’s conception will emerge further on. But before 
we go on, let me report here about Arriaga’s short polemics against Fran-
çois de Bonne Espérance (Franciscus Bonae Spei) OCD (1617–1677), a Belgian 
Carmelite, that he included in the revised edition of his Cursus. Bonne 
Espé rance and his Commentarii tres in universam Aristotelis philosophiam 
published in 1652 seems to be one of Arriaga’s favourite opponents. His 
discussion of beings of reason is brief but somewhat independently-minded. 
He openly argues that (by now) the well-established defi nition of a being 
of reason, as that which is objectively only in the intellect, is fl awed. When 
I assert, for instance, “ e identity between the goat and the stag is impos-
sible” the subject, i.e. the identity, exists objectively only in the intellect but 
still I do not make up anything since I am not thinking that something is 
otherwise than it is. Hence I am not making a being of reason. It follows 
ͫͩ In: Novotný, D., Ens rationis, op. cit., p. ͬͮ–ͬͯ, I have labeled as “ultrarealist” the view that 
beings of reason, since they are extrinsic beings, are a sort of real beings; but this label would 
better be reserved for the view that although beings of reason are irreducible to real beings 
(or to real extrinsic denominations), they are nevertheless mind-independent. 
ͫͪ “Ergo ens rationis a nobis solum accipitur in praesenti pro eo, quod habet tantum esse obiec-
tive in intellectu, id est, quod tantum habet cognosci.” Ibid., p. ͩͨͨͱ (d. ͯ, s. ͩ, n. ͮ-ͯ). 
ͫͫ Knebel tentatively traces the origin of this defi nition to the passing remark of Hervaeus Na-
talis OP (d. ͩͫͪͫ) (On Second Intetions, Trans. J. P. Doyle, Milwaukee, Marquette ͪͨͨͰ, p. ͫͮͪ) 
and gives a long list of authors who endorsed it before ͩͮͭͫ (Erkenntnistheoretisches, op. cit., 
p. ͫͭͰ). Bartolomeo Mastri OFMConv. (ͩͮͨͪ–ͩͮͯͫ) and Bonaventura Belluto OFMConv. 
(c. ͩͮͨͨ–ͩͮͯͮ) point out that it is „sentencia inter Recentiores receptissima, quibus praeivit 
Suarez“. Mastrius, B., Disputationes in Organum Aristotelis. Venetiis, Typ. Marci Ginamni ͪͩͮͬͮ 
[ͩͩͮͫͱ], p. ͪͱͰ (d. ͫ, q. ͪ, n. ͩͫ). 
ͫͬ Ibid., p. ͩͨͨͱ (d. ͯ, s. ͩ, n. ͮ-ͯ).
ͫͭ Arriaga discusses Bonne Espérance fi rst in section ͪ but the discussion more appropriately be-
longs here.
ͫͮ Bonae Spei, F., Commentarii tres in universam Aristotelis philosophiam. Bruxelle, Apud Francis-
cum Vivenium ͩͮͭͪ, p. ͫͨ–ͫͪ.
Arriaga (and Hurtado) against the Baroque Mainstream  ͩͪͭ
Kniha_Dvorak.indb   125 13.01.2017   8:41:24
that a being of reason should rather be defi ned as that which is possible but 
thought of as impossible, or conversely. Some philosophers might frown at 
this defi nition, because it contains a disjunction, Arriaga says. But he does 
not reject it for this reason and it can be easily fi xed anyway: “a being of 
reason is that concerning the possibility of which the intellect errs”. Never-
theless, he rejects even this revised defi nition – because it dissents from the 
majority opinion.	 Such a rejection looks surprising since Arriaga does not 
usually appeal to an authority and here he substantially agrees with Bonne 
Espérance. Both follow Hurtado in holding that beings of reason are false-
hoods, although (as we shall see) Arriaga’s view is unrestricted, including 
possible non-actual items (“Peter is running <he is not>”), whereas Bonne 
Espérance restricts falsehoods to the modal ones (“Peter is irrational”).
 
 us, the explanation for Arriaga’s shallow rejection of Bonne Espérance’s 
defi nition will probably be extrinsic, namely the offi  cial requirement to 
teach the “objectively only in the intellect” defi nition.
Arriaga’s section 1 remained unchanged between the fi rst and the last 
edition. As we have seen, at this point his discussion is derived from Hurtado. 
With respect to the nature of beings of reason, Arriaga joins Hurtado in his 
subversive revisionist campaign against the Baroque scholastic consensus 
on beings of reason, but his own contribution to the debate is negligible. As 
we shall see, more substantial will be his discussion of their existence in the 
next section.
2. Existence: Whether there are beings of reason?
Arriaga’s discussion of the existence of beings of reason opens with the confi -
dent claim that it is quite certain that they exist, in spite of “many authors” 
who completely deny them, such as Francisco Vallés (1524–1592), and of 
ͫͯ “Bonam-spem … [d]efi nit ergo ens rationis, quod, cum sit possibile, concipitur impossibile, 
vel e contrario, cum sit impossibile in se, concipitur possibile. … posset hoc modo mens eius 
Autho ris sine disiunctione explicari: ens rationis est, circa cuius possibilitatem errat intellectus 
… Reiicienda ergo est ea defi nitio, quia … discedit a Communi, cum fere omnes dicant illud esse 
ens rationis, quod solum habet esse in intellectu” Arriaga, R., Cursus philosophicus … expurga-
tus, ͩͮͮͱ, op. cit., p. ͩͨͩͨ (d. ͯ, s. ͪ, sb. ͩ, n ͩͬ-ͩͭ).
ͫͰ In our context Bonne Espérance does not mention Arriaga’s view about this matter neither 
approvingly nor disapprovingly. He is well aware of Arriaga’s work (as we may read in the 
Prolog) but his explicitly mentioned opponents with respect to beings of reason include only 
Thomas Compton Carleton SJ (ͩͭͱͪ–ͩͮͮͮ), Francisco Oviedo SJ (ͩͮͨͪ–ͩͮͭͩ) and John Punch 
OFM (c. ͩͭͱͱ–ͩͮͮͩ). In some of his claims he is closer to Hurtado than Arriaga. He argues, for 
instance, that chimeras, when considered as impossible, are not strictly speaking beings of 
reason, since we think what is true of them.
ͫͱ Vallés was a physician and philosopher who taught at Alcalá. His argumentation against beings 
of reason can be found in Controversiarum naturalium ad tyrones pars prima, Compluti, Andreas 
ͩͪͮ  Daniel D. Novotný
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some who think that it “cannot be convincingly shown that they exist and 
that the view of Vallés is probable enough.” Arriaga then sets out to prove 
the point and to deal with various objections of which the main concerns the 
possibility of “false acts without fi ctitious objects”.  e section also contains 
two debates, one against Richard Lynch SJ (1610–1676), an Irish student of 
Hurtado, and another against Bonne Espérance, that we have already dealt 
with. We shall see that whereas his discussion about the nature of beings of 
reason was rather disappointing, here he deals with the issues, especially in 
his replies to various objections, with some originality.
Arguments for beings of reason
 ere are two arguments for the existence of beings of reason that Arriaga 
presents.  e main one, which we might call the falsehood argument, 
consists in the observation that there are false acts of the intellect. In the 
fi rst edition he puts it as follows: 
 is is how I show [the existence of beings of reason]: First, it is 
not possible to deny that some acts are false and some are true. 
Secondly, it is not possible to deny that the false acts are false be-
cause their object is not in reality as they affi  rm it, and the true 
acts are true because their object is in reality as they affi  rm. … 
 us, some objects are not in reality.
ab Angulo, ͩͭͮͫ, p. ͩͰ–ͩͱ (n. ͩͨ). Besides Vallés, closer to home, it would be more appropriate 
to enlist Hurtado’s colleague Valentín de Herice SJ (ͩͭͯͪ–ͩͮͫͮ) who taught theology in Vallad-
olid and Salamanca and whom Hurtado calls synmagister meus (Scholasticon). Herice argues in 
favor of: “Secunda sententia negat intellectui hanc virtutem quasi eff ectricem entis rationis et 
arbitratur, quidquid respondet ex parte obiecti, distinctumque est ab actu intelletus, esse in se 
ens reale” (Quatuor Tractatus in I. Partem S. Thomae, Pamplonae, Caroli ͩͮͪͬ, p. ͩͯͬ). Although 
Herice’s views on beings of reason diff er from Hurtado’s they both take fallibilism as the point 
of departure: “cum intellectus humanus confi ngit ens rationis, id effi  cit per iudicium falsum.” 
Ibid., p. ͩͯͭ. 
ͬͨ Ibid., p. ͩͨͨͱ (d. ͯ, s. ͩ, n. ͯ). 
ͬͩ “Meus etiam quonam in sacra Theologia Magister P. Petrus Hurtado de Mendoza quam mag-
nus fuerit Philosophiae mystes, decies repetitae philosophici cursu editiones testantur: semel 
ille edidit, iterum atque iterum doctrinae suae splendor vulgavit. Vir certe fuit in inveniendis 
placitis profundus, in seligendis dexter, in confi rmandis, quibus assentiebat, solidus, atque in 
infi rmandi, quibus dissentiebat, acerrimus.” Lynceus, R., Universa philosophia scholastica, Lug-
duni, Sumpt. Pilippi Borde ͩͮͭͬ, Prologus. 
ͬͪ “Quod sic ostendo: nam primum negari nequit actus aliquos esse falsos, aliquos esse veros. 
Secundo negari nequit, actus falsos ideo esse falsos, quia obiectum illorum non est a parte rei, 
sicut per ipsos affi  rmatur: veros autem ideo esse veros, quia obiectum eorum ita est, ut per 
ipsos affi  rmatur. … Ergo aliqui actus sunt, quorum obiecta non sunt a parte rei.” Arriaga, R., 
Cursus philosophicus, ͩͮͫͪ, op. cit., p. ͰͰͬ (d. ͮ, s. ͪ, n. Ͱ). 
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 e paragraph was dropped in the revised edition, perhaps as Arriaga 
rea lized greater complexity of the debate and the dissent grew; the passage 
was explicitly criticized by Juan Caramuel y Lobkowitz (O.Cist.) (1606–1682) 
in 1654. In the revised edition he does not formulate the argument in the 
same simple and straightforward way, but the point remains. He argues: 
Let us take, for instance, the statement “the horse is rational”.  e object of 
this act is the rational horse. Of course, such a fi ctitious horse cannot exist 
(dari) really (a parte rei), but it is known (cognoscitur) by our intellect, it is an 
object for our intellect and thus it has merely objective being in our intellect. 
Examples such as these are called “beings of reason” and they clearly occur. If 
anybody would like to deny this, the dispute would be verbal and one would 
have to go “against experience, reason and the consensus even of rustics.” 
 e falsehood argument is not original. It can be found in Hurtado, even with 
the same reference to just one opponent, Vallés. We shall be occupied with 
this argument when we come to objections.
Arriaga’s other argument for beings of reason, which might be called 
ontological, was also taken over, this time from Suárez: to deny beings of 
reason leads to self-contradiction because the existence of beings of reason 
is nothing else than knowing or apprehending them, so by the very negating 
them one apprehends them. Otherwise one would be denying one knows not 
what, which is ridiculous.	  e argument seems to be considered sound by 
most scholastics of the time. As far as I know it was fi rst criticized by Cara-
muel in 1681.
 
False acts without fi ctitious objects?
 ere are various objections against beings of reason that Arriaga considers, 
one of which goes against the core of the falsehood argument: 
 
ͬͫ Metalogica disputationes de logicae essentia, proprietatibus et operationibus continens, Sumpt. 
J. G. Schonwetteri, Francofurti ͩͮͭͬ, p. ͯͩ. Caramuel criticises also other aspects of Arriaga’s 
views rather exensively (p. ͯͩ–ͯͮ). He singles him out because: “Eius ingenium magni facio; 
pollet enim eximio et nihil aliud omnio agit, quam meditari, docere, disputare et scribere. Claret 
libris impressis, quibus annis multis totus Orbis litterarius applaudit. Philosophicum cursum edi-
dit anno ͩͮͫͪ et in ipso multa valde ingeniosa et rara.” Ibid., p. ͯͩ.
ͬͬ Arriaga, Cursus philosophicus … expurgatus, ͩͮͮͱ, op. cit., p. ͩͨͩͨ (d. ͯ, s. ͪ, sb. ͩ, n. ͩͭ-ͩͮ).
ͬͭ See e.g. Novotný, D., Ens rationis, op. cit., p. ͩͩͭ.
ͬͮ Ibid., p. ͭͩ. 
ͬͯ Arriaga, R., Cursus philosophicus … expurgatus, ͩͮͮͱ, op. cit., p. ͩͨͩͨ.
ͬͰ Caramuel, J., Leptotatos latine subtilissimus. Vigevanis, Typ. Episcopalibus ͩͮͰͩ, p. ͩͨͪ. See also 
briefl y Novotný, D., Ens rationis, op. cit., p. ͩͯͫ–ͩͯͬ. Caramuel argued in various other ways 
against beings of reason already in his earlier works, namely Rationalis et realis philosophia, Typ. 
Evardardi de Witte, Lovanii ͩͮͬͪ, p. ͯͮ–ͱͨ and more extensively in Metalogica disputationes, 
op. cit., p. ͬͬ–ͯͯ.
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You might object that our intellect intentionally connects the 
true and real rationality, which it knows from other things, 
with a horse, without conceiving in this act something fi cti-
tious.  us, it is not necessary [to posit] some beings of reason 
which would correspond to this fi ction-making act from the 
part of the object. 
We see that the opponent admits that there are false mental acts, but denies 
that there are any special fi ctitious objects corresponding to them. A false 
act, such as “the horse is rational”, does not need any fi ctitious irrational 
horse as its object; all we need are the real component objects rationality and 
horse. Arriaga presents three replies to this objection: 
(1) When I say “the horse is rational” I do not predicate of the horse the 
rationality of (let’s say) Peter but the rationality which is neither Pe-
ter’s, nor Mary’s, nor of any other (actual or possible) individual. I predi-
cate some other rationality, similar to the real one, but which is made 
up. 
(2) Even if components of beings of reason were real, their union is defi nite-
ly not, since it does not exist in reality and hence it is fi ctitious. To reply 
that the real unity as such is real because it exists in other things will 
not do. First, the unity of components of the being of reason is not nu-
merically the same unity as the unity found in real things (and hence we 
cannot claim that it is real). Secondly, even if we wanted to grant that it 
is real, it is claimed to be here and now, which is not the case. Hence it is 
not real but fi ctitious.
(3) We need to distinguish two senses of intentional unifi cation/identifi ca-
tion. In the formal sense, we do not affi  rm the unity of the two items 
but we instead take them confusedly, and thus do not distinguish them. 
 is happens, for instance, in case of thinking of universals. Here no 
being of reason is produced and these mental acts are true, although 
formally speaking they unite things incapable of being unifi ed. In the 
objective sense, we explicitly apprehend or affi  rm the unity of the two 
ͬͱ “Respondebis primo, intellectum nostrum veram et realem rationalitatem, quam in aliis rebus 
cognoscit, connectere intentionaliter cum equo, quin per eum actum aliquid fi ctum concipiat, 
ergo non est necessarium tale ens rationis, quod correspondeat ex parte obiecti actui fi ngenti.” 
Arriaga, R., Cursus philosophicus … expurgatus, ͩͮͮͱ, op. cit., p. ͩͨͩͩ (d. ͯ, s. ͪ, sb. ͩ, n. ͩͯ). 
ͭͨ Ibid., p. ͩͨͩͩ (d. ͯ, s. ͪ, sb. ͩ, n. ͩͯ). 
ͭͩ “Secundo … quia licet extrema sint realia, unio tamen affi  rmata non est realis, sed fi cta … quia 
licet extrema dentur a parte rei seorsim, non tamen identifi cata inter se, ergo talis identitas est 
fi cta, ergo est ens rationis.” Ibid., p. ͩͨͩͩ (d. ͯ, s. ͪ, sb. ͩ, n.ͩͱ).
ͭͪ Ibid., p. ͩͨͩͩ (d. ͯ, s. ͪ, sb. ͩ, n. ͩͱ). 
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incompatible things. Here we do affi  rm a unity and thus our act is false, 
because there does not exist any such unity.  is unity is fi ctitious and 
called a being of reason in the proper sense.
In all of these replies Arriaga takes as the point of departure strong nominal-
istic rejection of universals. (1)  ere is no rationality as such; in predicating 
rationality of a horse and of a man I predicate two distinct rationalities. 
(2)  ere is no unity as such; the (falsely asserted) unity of rationality with 
a horse and (truly asserted) unity of rationality with a man are two distinct 
unities. (3)  ere are two irreducible kinds of unifi cation; the formal works 
by confusion and yields universals (i.e. they are not the result of abstrac-
tion), whereas the objective works explicitly and yields non-existent fi ctions. 
All of these replies leave unmoved those who do not reject universals as 
Arriaga does. His nominalism also plays pivotal role in the debate with Lynch 
to which we now turn.
The debate with Lynch
In 1654 Lynch published his Universa philosophia scholastica, where he 
defended reductionist view that beings of reason are “nothing but an aggre-
gate of real entities” Arriaga reports:
Fr. Lynch … strongly defends the view that the being of reason 
is nothing more than an aggregate of real entities … and an es-
sentially false (mental) act by which the true identity is applied 
to them. He works to establish that all parts of some complex 
are real, while the complex remains fi ctitious. 
ͭͫ Ibid., p. ͩͨͩͩ (d. ͯ, s. ͪ, sb. ͩ, n. ͩͱ-ͪͩ). 
ͭͬ Arriaga’s underlying nominalism in this context was noticed by Caramuel, who says that “tota 
haec Replica nascitur ex quodam gravissimo errore … [in the margin] Arriaga negat omnia 
universalia, etsi se illa admittere dicat“ (Metalogica, op. cit., p. ͯͪ). For Arriaga’s systematic 
exposition of universals, see Sousedík, S., Arriagas Universalienlehre. In: Saxlová, T. – Sousedík, 
S., Rodrigo de Arriaga († ͭͲͲͳ), op. cit., p. ͬͩ–ͬͱ. Surprisingly, Mastri and Belluto are impressed 
by Arriaga’s defense of fi ctitious objects with the help of these nominalistic arguments and 
approvingly refer to him. See Novotný, D., Ens rationis, op. cit., p. ͩͬͩ.
ͭͭ Lynceus, R., Universa philosophia, op. cit., vol. ͫ, p. ͪͪͯ–ͪͫͯ (l. ͬ, t. ͩ).
ͭͮ “Pater Lynceus … fortissime defendit ens rationis nihil penitus aliud esse, quam aggregatum 
ex entibus realibus … et actu reali essentialiter falso, quo identitas vera his extremis applica-
tur. Est autem totus, ut probet, posse omnes partes alicuius complexi esse reales, et tamen 
complexum esse fi ctum.” Ibid., p. ͩͨͨͱ (d. ͯ, s. ͪ, sb. ͩ, n. ͱ). Lynch’s formula: “ens rationis, 
quamvis de eo affi  rmari possit non esse ens reale, tamen non est, aliquid adaequate distinctum 
a complexione plurium entium realium, sed potius est aggregatum quoddam per accidens ex 
extremis realibus, et actu intellectus essentialiter falso: et applicante iis veram, ac realem iden-
titatem, quae tamen inter eis reperiri nequit” Lynceus, R., Universa philosophia, op. cit., vol. ͫ, 
p. ͪͪͰ. He mis ascribes his view to Suárez and Hurtado.
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Arriaga briefl y summarizes several of Lynch’s arguments, two of which 
stand out. First, that to be objectively in the intellect is in fact just to be the 
act of the intellect itself, which is real.	 Second, that the identity of (even) 
incompossible entities precedes the act of the intellect, hence it is (mind-
independent) and real.
 Arriaga is not impressed and claims that he has 
already dealt with similar objections in the fi rst edition.  is does not seem 
to be quite the case but it is true that he indicated there the distinction 
between the act and the object, hence undermining the fi rst argument, and 
affi  rmed of some entities that they do not have preceding potency, hence 
undermining the second argument (see further below the second objec-
tion). In three points Arriaga “summarizes what he had done in the original 
edition but what Lynch ignored”: 
• First, when we assert that there is a unity between (for instance) the goat 
and the stag we start with the real unity but since we claim it is where it 
is not, we make it fi ctitious.
• Secondly, if according to Lynch the whole has only real parts and it is 
nothing but the union of all its parts, how come the whole is not real (but 
impossible)?  e very meaning of “ e goat-stag is impossible” is unclear 
as both the act and its object is possible.
• Finally, although the intellect is real it is distinct from its object and so the 
being of reason (something non-real) can be made by it.
To these three points from the fi rst edition Arriaga adds that the false act 
must be about some false (fi ctitious) object otherwise it could not be false. 
It cannot be about itself, for it is not refl exive (and anyway if it were then it 
ͭͯ “…quia esse obiective in intellectu dicit formalissime ipsum actum, quo concipitur, qui est ens 
reale.” Arriaga, R., Cursus philosophicus … expurgatus, ͩͮͮͱ, op. cit., p. ͩͨͨͱ (d. ͯ, s. ͪ, sb. ͩ, 
n. Ͱ).
ͭͰ “Denique, quia identitas hominis et equi, quam nos fi ngimus, antecedit actum intellectus, ergo 
est ens reale.” Ibid., p. ͩͨͨͱ (d.ͯ, s. ͪ, sb. ͩ, n. Ͱ).
ͭͱ Ibid., p. ͩͨͨͱ-ͩͨ (d. ͯ, s. ͪ, sb. ͩ, n. ͩͨ). 
ͮͨ Ibid., p. ͩͨͨͱ (d. ͯ, s. ͪ, sb. ͩ, n. Ͱ-ͱ). 
ͮͩ Ibid., p. ͩͨͨͱ (d. ͯ, s. ͪ, sb. ͩ, n. ͱ). 
ͮͪ “Denique ergo non capio, quid velimus dicere, dum asserimus, Hirco-cervus repugnat, si omnia, 
quae per illam vocem signifi camus sunt possibilia, igitur aliquid ibi ex parte obiecti repugnans 
signifi co, non autem ipsum actum quo id dico, quia ille est ens reale et realissimum, ac verissi-
mum. … non illius actus obiecta, quia et haec sunt possibilia iuxta hunc Authorem. Quid ergo, 
quaeso, per illum actum attingo, quod repugnet?” Ibid., p. ͩͨͨͱ (d. ͯ, s. ͪ, sb. ͩ, n. ͱ-ͩͨ). 
ͮͫ “Tertio … intellectum non facere ens rationis, quasi se ipso formaliter … sed habendo pro 
obiecto aliquid distinctum a se.” Ibid., p. ͩͨͨͱ-ͩͨ (d. ͯ, s. ͪ, sb. ͩ, n. ͩͨ). 
ͮͬ “Primum fuit, quod saltem in existentia eius identitatis in hoc loco debet intervenire obiec-
tum fi ctum, et …, quod ipse tradit, … ens rationis debere fi eri actu falso … Sic argumentor: 
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would be about some real entity and hence not false but true). So where 
does its falsity come from? To say that from applying unity where it is 
not will not do unless one concedes that this unity is fi ctitious.	  is unity 
cannot be real: 
[W]hen I conceive the identity between the goat and the stag, 
I do not conceive some real identity but rather a fi ctitious uni-
ty, therefore [the false act is about some false fi ctitious object]. 
I demonstrate the antecedent clearly, because I do not receive 
the identity from any real entities in the intellect. [If somebody 
disagrees] may he, please, tell me from which ones [I would 
do so]? Not even when I mistakenly make up something, I am 
so stupid as to judge: the numerically same real identity, which 
is between, e.g. the animality and the rationality of Peter, is 
also the numerically same as between the goat and the stag; 
I know that [what is] numerically one and the same cannot be 
taken from its real relata, which it connects; hence I conceive 
or make up some other unity, which is distinct, and this one 
I place into the goat-stag.

We see again that Arriaga’s defence of the irreducibility of beings of reason to 
(aggregates) of real beings assumes his nominalistic rejection of universals. 
What he seems to suggest here is that the identity of the animality and the 
rationality in Peter is numerically diff erent from the identity of the goat and 
the stag in the goat-stag. Realists would agree that these identities numeri-
cally diff er but why shouldn’t they? We do not predicate numerically the 
ergo iste actus habet aliquid pro obiecto, quod non est, alioquin falsus esse non posset.” Ibid., 
p. ͩͨͩͨ (d. ͯ, s. ͪ, sb. ͩ, n. ͩͨ).
ͮͭ “Non habet se refl exe, quia supra se non refl ectit, et vero si se haberet, esset verus.” Ibid., 
p. ͩͨͩͨ (d. ͯ, s. ͪ, sb. ͩ, n. ͩͩ-ͩͪ) 
ͮͮ “…non habet pro obiecto equum, quia hic est aliquid a parte rei existens; non hominem, quia 
et hic existit; non unionem, quia et haec per se est realis. In quo ergo errat hic actus? unde ergo 
est falsus?“ Ibid., p. ͩͨͩͨ (d. ͯ, s. ͪ, sb. ͩ, n. ͩͩ-ͩͪ).
ͮͯ “Dices: quia illam unionem applicat equo et homini. Contra: eam applicat dicendo, eam esse 
inter illa extrema, ergo saltem existentia unionis in eo loco est fi cta … ergo necessario debet ex 
parte obiecti aliquid respondere fi ctum.” Ibid., p. ͩͨͩͨ (d. ͯ, s. ͪ, sb. ͩ, n. ͩͩ-ͩͪ).
ͮͰ “…quando concipio identitatem inter hircum et cervum, non concipio ullam identitatem 
realem, sed aliam fi ctam, ergo. Probo antecedens manifeste, quia ego non accipio per intellec-
tum identitatem ab ullis entibus realibus. Dicat quaeso mihi, a quibus? neque quando per erro-
rem fi ngo aliquid, sum tam stupidus, ut iudicem: identitas illa realis eadem numero, quae est 
inter animalitatem et rationalitatem Petri v.g., … illa eadem numero est inter hircum et cervum, 
scio enim, non posse illam numero realem abesse a suis extremis realibus, quae connectunt, 
ergo aliam distinctam concipio seu fi ngo, et illam pono in hirco-cervo.” Ibid., p. ͩͨͩͨ (d. ͯ, s. ͪ, 
sb. ͩ, n. ͩͩ-ͩͪ). 
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same predicate of their subjects. On the contrary, predicating the animality 
of goats and of Peter does not involve numerically but generically the same 
animality (which is “individualized” within the given goat and Peter).  e 
same holds of the identity that we predicate of humans, i.e. rational-animals, 
and of goat-stags.
 e status of the identity (unity) of elements within self-contradictory 
beings, i.e. whether it is real or fi ctitious, and the correlated question of 
whether the repugnancy between these elements is internal or external, 
became one of the most controversial questions of late Baroque scholas-
ticism.  e debate was usually carried out under the heading “Are there 
beings of reason distinct from all real (even possible) beings?” John P. Doyle 
traces the historical background of this question to the two basic late ancient 
and medieval views on where to place self-contradictory beings such as the 
goat-stag: Alexander of Aphrodisias (fl . 200 AD) claims that they are beings 
per accidens, i.e. aggregates of real incompatible beings, whereas Averroes 
(1126–1198) says that they are beings as true or false, i.e. something in the 
mind.	 Alexander’s view is reductionist, whereas Averroes’s anti-reduc-
tionist. Arriaga and others represent the heirs of the view that beings of 
reason (understood narrowly as self-contradictory) are irreducible to and 
distinct from real beings, whereas Lynch and others, e.g. Tirso Gonzáles de 
Santalla SJ (1624–1705), represent the heirs of the view that beings of reason 
are reducible to and ultimately non-distinct from real beings. Growing 
number of authors joined the camp of reductivists.	 Writing within the 
Jesuit tradition toward the end of the nineteenth century, José J. Urráburu 
SJ (1844–1904) briefl y recapitulates the debate and declares reductionism to 
be the minority view, although “probable enough” and backed up by many 
ͮͱ The status of the unity and its expression by the copula is closely related to the topics of simple 
apprehension and judgment. See Knebel, S. K., Erkenntnistheoretishes, op. cit. e.g. p. ͩͪͬ–ͩͫͨ 
for broader context. “Der Streit um die irrealen Gegenstände war also im Kern ein Streit um 
die Auff assung der Copulafunktion, zunächst im unmöglich wahren Urteil, dann im Urteil über-
haupt.” Ibid., p. ͩͪͰ.
ͯͨ Doyle, J. P., Impossible Objects. In: On the Borders of Being and Knowing Late Scholastic Theory 
of Supertranscendental Being, op. cit., p. ͱͬ–ͩͪͮ. The mention of the goat-stag occurs in the 
commentary on Metaphysics Ε, which is considered not to be Alexander’s genuine work (Com-
mentaria in Aristotelem Graeca, Ed. M. Hayduck, Berlin, Reimer ͩͰͱͩ, vol. ͩ, p. ͬͬͰ). Doyle also 
briefl y considers earlier Aristotelian commentators that anticipate Averroes’s view.
ͯͩ We might also call them eliminativists since they agreed that there are no beings of reason 
(in what was agreed to be the narrowest, proper sense of the word). See Novotný, D., Ens 
rationis, op. cit., p. ͫͬ–ͫͭ, ͩͯͭ–ͩͯͱ, ͪͬͱnͱ.
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(Jesuit) authorities.	 Much of the Baroque debate of this question, due to the 
intricacy and complexity, remained unpublished in manuscripts.	 
Other objections 
Arriaga considers four other objections against the existence of beings of 
reason.  e last one, concerning the question whether there are possible 
beings of reason, e.g. “Peter is running <he is not>”, is presented but the 
answer is postponed to the next section (see below).	 
 e fi rst objection, which was added in the revised edition, states that if 
there were beings of reason a contradiction would follow. For suppose we 
take the negation of the being of reason.  e negation does not exist in reality 
and hence it is a being of reason. But the negation of something cannot be 
that something. Hence there are no beings of reason. Many recent thinkers, 
Arriaga points out, trust this argument a lot.	 In his reply he distinguishes 
two meanings of “the negation of the being of reason”. First, we may mean the 
absence of a being of reason. In this sense (given the context) the negation 
of a being of reason is really “out there” before the activity of the intellect, 
hence we do not say of this negation that it is a being of reason.	 Second ly, 
we may mean by this expression the merely possible being of reason, i.e. the 
being of reason that is not actual at the moment. Although we do say of this 
negation that it is a being of reason, we may do so and there is no problem 
ͯͪ First of all by Juan Ulloa SJ (ͩͮͫͱ–ͩͯͪͫ), but also by Herice, Lynch, Antonio Pérez SJ (ͩͭͱͱ–ͩͮͬͱ), 
Martín de Esparza SJ (ͩͮͨͮ–ͩͮͰͱ), Pietro Sforza Pallavicino SJ (ͩͮͨͯ–ͩͮͮͯ), Gaspar Ribadene-
ira SJ (ͩͮͩͩ–ͩͮͯͭ), Thyrso Gonzales, Giovanni Battista de Benedictis SJ (ͩͮͬͩ–ͩͯͨͮ), Giovanni 
Battista Tolomei SJ (ͩͮͭͫ–ͩͯͪͮ), Anton Mayr SJ (ͩͮͯͫ–ͩͯͬͱ) and Luis de Losada SJ (ͩͮͰͩ–ͩͯͬͰ), 
in addition to older authors such as Durand, Franciscus Mayronis OFM (c. ͩͪͰͨ–ͩͫͪͰ), and Ber-
nardinus Mirandulanus (ͩͭͨͪ–ͩͭͮͭ). As the proponents of the irreducibility view he singles out 
Georges de Rhodes SJ (ͩͭͱͯ–ͩͮͮͩ), Sebastián Izquierdo SJ (ͩͮͨͩ–ͩͮͰͩ), Arriaga, Silvestro Mauro 
SJ (ͩͮͩͱ–ͩͮͰͯ) and André Sémery SJ (ͩͮͫͨ–ͩͯͩͯ). See Urráburu, J. J. Ontologia, Avrial, Madrid 
ͩͱͨͪ, p. ͩͨͫ–ͩͨͰ. (First published in Valladolid in ͩͰͱͩ). The list is, of course, not exhaustive. For 
instance, Jan Morawski SJ (ͩͮͫͫ–ͩͯͨͨ), a student of Esparza and a reductionist, gives other, 
little known names in Totius Philosophiae Principia, Posnaniae, Typ. Heredum ͩͮͮͮ, p. ͩͨ. See 
also another reductionist Paul Aler SJ, Conclusiones ex universa philosophia circa quaestiones 
maxime controversas, Coloniae, ͩͮͱͪ, p. ͪͪ (in Metaphysica). The modern entry-point to the 
study of this debate is Doyle, J. P., Impossible Objects, op. cit. Further extensive references can 
be found in Knebel, S. K., Erkenntistheoretisches, op. cit., p. ͫͮͰ–ͫͯͫ. Reductionism has been 
recently defended by Novák, L., Scire Deum esse, op. cit., p. ͩͯͨ–ͩͰͯ.
ͯͫ This is what Ignacio Francisco Peinado SJ (ͩͮͫͫ–ͩͮͱͮ), a defender of the irreducibility, explic-
itly points out (Disputationes in Universam Aristotelis Logicam, Sumpt. Collegii, Compluti ͩͮͯͩ, 
p. ͫͮͫ). Knebel’s publication of Tirso Gonzales’s manuscripts with a highly complex discussion 
of this question confi rms this (Erkenntistheoretisches, op. cit. p. Ͱͭ–ͩͨͩ and ͫͭͯ–ͬͫͫ).
ͯͬ Arriaga, R., Cursus philosophicus … expurgatus, ͩͮͮͱ, op. cit., p. ͩͨͩͪ (d. ͯ, s. ͪ, sb. ͪ, n. ͪͯ) .
ͯͭ Ibid., p. ͩͨͩͩ (d. ͯ, s. ͪ, sb. ͪ, n. ͪͪ).
ͯͮ Ibid., p. ͩͨͩͩ (d. ͯ, s. ͪ, sb. ͪ, n. ͪͪ).
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in it as we may also say of both the actual and the non-actual horse that it is 
a horse.		 Either way, there is no reason to reject beings of reason.
 e second objection states that the being (esse) precedes the being 
known (cognosci) but beings of reason have no such preceding being because 
for them to be is to be (actually) known. Arriaga replies to the objection by 
denying the universal truth of the claim that the being precedes the being 
known, and points out that besides beings of reason we have also refl exive 
acts, the being of which does not precede their being known.	

 e third objection: suppose that the false act, e.g. “ e horse is rational” 
is about the fi ctitious unity. Since the act is truly about it, it is true, which 
is a contradiction. Hence the false act cannot be about the fi ctitious unity. 
It can only be about the real unity, which is, however, missing in reality, 
thereby making the act false.  ere is no fi ctitious unity corresponding to 
the false act.	 Arriaga off ers three replies: 
•  e fi rst seems to complain that the objection is incoherent because it ad-
mits the existence of the fi ctitious unity, which is then denied. ( is reply, 
if I understand it correctly, is quite bad since it could be applied against all 
indirect arguments.)
 
• In his second reply Arriaga denies that the (false) act about the fi ctitious 
unity would be true: the fi ctitious unity is brought about only by the act 
itself and it wasn’t there before it. Since this act is not refl exive but con-
cerns what was before it, it is false since there was indeed no unity, fi cti-
tious nor real.
 
• In his third, perhaps crucial reply, Arriaga again denies that the (false) act 
about the fi ctitious unity would be true. For the act is false not because 
there is no real unity, but because there is the fi ctitious unity instead of 
ͯͯ “Secundo, respondetur, id quod tetigit Bona Spes negationem entis rationis esse solum ens 
rationis possibile, non actuale, ens vero rationis esse actuale … non esse illud quod est ipsa 
negatio, sed aliud distinctum.” Ibid., p. ͩͨͩͩ (d. ͯ, s. ͪ, sb. ͪ, n. ͪͪ).
ͯͰ Ibid., p. ͩͨͩͪ (d. ͯ, s. ͪ, sb. ͪ, n. ͪͫ). For Mastri’s and Belluto’s discussion of the question, see 
Novotný, D., Ens rationis, op. cit., p. ͩͬͪ–ͩͬͮ.
ͯͱ  Arriaga, R., Cursus philosophicus … expurgatus, ͩͮͮͱ, op. cit., p. ͩͨͩͪ (d. ͯ, s. ͪ, sb. ͪ, n. ͪͬ).
Ͱͨ “Hoc argumentum nonnullis facessit magnum negotium, sed immerito: primo enim involvit im-
plicantiam in terminis, dicunt enim ex una parte, non dari talem unionem fi ctam, aliunde autem 
addunt, quod si ea affi  rmetur per illum actum, actus esset verus, quia datur talis unio fi cta, ergo 
iam admittis unionem fi ctam, alioquin licet affi  rmaret actus, non esset verus, quia non daretur 
quod affi  rmat.” Ibid., p. ͩͨͩͪ (d. ͯ, s. ͪ, sb. ͪ, n. ͪͬ). 
Ͱͩ “Deinde, licet actus affi  rmaret dari unionem fi ctam, adhuc non esset verus, quia illa unio fi cta 
datur formaliter per ipsum actum, qui non est supra se refl exivus; ante actum autem non datur 
talis unio fi cta, ergo esset falsus.” Ibid., p. ͩͨͩͪ (d. ͯ, s. ͪ, sb. ͪ, n. ͪͬ). 
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the real one, i.e. something is otherwise than it is claimed to be, which is 
a being of reason.

As we have seen, Arriaga deals with the existence of beings of reason in 
a detailed way. What is most controversial about them is their alleged 
complete distinction from real being, i.e. the question that has to do with 
their nature. In defending the anti-reductionist view Arriaga seems to 
proceed with an originality for which he was well known, going in his argu-
mentation beyond Hurtado. Some of the issues concerning the nature of 
beings of reason will also pop up in the next section. 
3. Causes: Which human powers make beings of reason? 
 ere is a universal agreement, Arriaga claims, that beings of reason are 
made by intellective acts in which something is falsely thought as possible 
or impossible:
I hold that … a being of reason can be made up by the intellect 
… through the acts in which possible things are thought of as 
impossible or conversely. On this everybody agrees for obvious 
reasons since the object of such acts does not have other being 
than that of being known, thus it will be a being of reason.

 e controversy is whether all false intellective acts and whether internal 
senses, external senses, the simple apprehension, the lower appetite and 
the will make beings of reason. As we shall see, departing from Hurtado’s 
views, Arriaga gives affi  rmative answer to all of these. In subsection 1 he 
deals with the false acts, in subsection 2 with internal senses, in subsec-
tion 3 with external senses and the rest.
 However, before looking at the 
particular faculties involved in the production of beings of reason, let me 
Ͱͪ Ibid., p. ͩͨͩͪ (d. ͯ, s. ͪ, sb. ͪ, n. ͪͭ-ͮ). In this paragraph Arriaga also points out to the irreduc-
ibility of “falsity experience”: “…dicere falsam esse veram et veram dicere esse falsam. Quid 
autem sit hoc dicere, respondeo esse ipsam essentiam actus intellectu, cognitam experientia 
actuum falsorum, quae non potest ulterius explicari; sicut non potest ulterius explicari, quid sit 
cognoscere albedinem …” Ibid., p. ͩͨͩͪ (d. ͯ, s. ͪ, sb. ͪ, n. ͪͮ).
Ͱͫ Ibid., p. ͩͨͩͪ (d. ͯ, s. ͪ, sb. ͪ, n. ͪͯ). 
Ͱͬ He also briefl y discusses the question whether angels make beings of reason. The answer is 
why not: since it is possible for them to sin, which is worse, and it is possible for them to make 
errorss, i.e. beings of reason. Ibid., p. ͩͨͩͭ (d. ͯ, s. ͪ, sb. ͫ, n. ͬͭ).
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briefl y summarize Arriaga’s main claims concerning the general features of 
this production.
 
• When we speak of “making” ( facere) or “making up” (fi ngere) of beings of 
reason, something similar to the real effi  cient cause, which is involved in 
producing real beings, is meant.
 
•  e resulting object, the being of reason, is to be distinguished from the 
act that causes it since it is impossible, whereas the act is something real 
and possible.
	 
• We cannot say more about the “fi ctitious being” of beings of reason. It is, 
as we would say today, a “primitive notion”.

 
•  e being of reason is made sometimes because of the perfection of the in-
tellect (in judgments such as “ e rational horse is impossible”) and other 
times because of its imperfection (when we make mistakes).

Arriaga does not deal with these issues in depth and we thus turn our atten-
tion to the ones more central to him. 
False intellective acts 
Do all false acts of the intellect, even the contingent ones, such as “Peter is 
running <he is not>”, make up beings of reason? Since it is possible for Peter 
to run even when he is not, it was the standard scholastic view of the time 
to deny that. In Arriaga’s view, however, the whole disagreement about 
this question is verbal. We may either call a being of reason that which does 
not have any actual or potential being outside of the intellect (extra intel-
lectum); in this case Peter’s running, while he is not running, would not be 
a being of reason since it has the potential being. But we may also call a being 
of reason that which insofar as it is cognized does not have other being 
than the one from the intellect (quod prout cognoscitur non habet aliud esse 
quam per intellectum). In this case, even though Peter’s running is possible, 
Ͱͭ Arriaga discusses this out of place at the end of section ͭ dealing with the division of beings of 
reason. 
Ͱͮ Ibid., p. ͩͨͩͯ (d. ͯ, s. ͭ, n. ͭͰ).
Ͱͯ “…illud autem eo modo quo est, distinguitur ab ipso actu, qui est quid possibile et reale, licet 
eius obiectum sit impossibile.” Ibid., p. ͩͨͩͯ (d. ͯ, s. ͭ, n. ͭͰ).
ͰͰ “Rogabis: quid ergo est illud distinctum esse obiecti? Respondeo, nihil reale, sed precise est 
homo fi ctus, equus fi ctus, etc. quod non potest amplius declarari, nec est quaerenda aliqua 
entitas in eo quod est purum nihil.” Ibid., p. ͩͨͩͯ (d. ͯ, s. ͭ, n. ͭͰ).
Ͱͱ “Circa modum quo fi t ens rationis … si fi at per fi ctionem, oriri id ex imperfectione et limitatione 
potentiae, quae potest falli, iudicando illud esse cum vere non sit. Si autem fi t per actus veros, 
ut fi t a Deo, provenit ex virtute intellectus, qui suis actibus potest ad ea quae non sunt ferri, 
tanquam ad ea quae sunt.” Ibid., p. ͩͨͩͯ d. ͯ, s. ͭ, n. ͭͰ). 
ͱͨ Ibid., p. ͩͨͩͪ (d. ͯ, s. ͫ, sb. ͩ, n. ͪͰ).
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we think of it as actual and as actual it is only in the intellect. Hence it is 
a being of reason. Arriaga clearly reveals his sympathy for the latter view. 
In the revised edition he complains of “wild disputes” concerning this ques-
tion, and of attacks against the view taken by him and Hurtado. One of the 
consequences of this view is that there are two genera of beings of reason, 
namely the possible, e.g. Peter (an actually nonexisting individual affi  rmed 
as existing), and impossible, e.g. a rational horse. Arriaga repeats the point 
further below, when dealing with the division of beings of reason.
Internal and external senses 
Beings of reason, as the very name suggests, are traditionally considered 
to be the product of the intellect only, not of senses. Hurtado upheld this 
doctrine because senses do not judge something to be true or false and there-
fore cannot make it. Arriaga, however, does not fi nd this reason convincing. 
In his view not just the intellect but also internal and even external senses 
can make mistakes, and therefore beings of reason, although he admits 
that truth and the falsity is not found in them in the strict sense of the 
word. But our imagination makes up chimeras and our sight presents 
large things, such as the Sun or the stars, much smaller than they are.  ese 
are mistakes and beings of reason. In defending the view that senses can 
err and are capable of making beings of reason, Arriaga explicitly departs 
from the opposite view of Hurtado who claims that senses cannot affi  rm or 
deny something but can only reach “accidentia sensibilia” and thus are inca-
pable of making beings of reason.	 Strangely, Arriaga enlists Suárez as an 
ally, although he did not hold the same view. In fact he explicitly denied that 
senses are capable of making beings of reason.
 From the view that senses 
ͱͩ Ibid., p. ͩͨͩͪ (d. ͯ, s. ͫ, sb. ͩ, n. ͪͰ).
ͱͪ “Unde mirandum est nonnullos postea tam ferio de hac questione egisse et sententiam meam 
ac Hurtadi graviter reiecisse, cum (ut olim dixi) explicatis terminis omnes debeamus necessario 
convenire.” Ibid., p. ͩͨͩͪ (d. ͯ, s. ͫ, sb. ͩ, n. ͪͰ) For Hurtado, see e.g. Novotný, D., Ens rationis, 
op. cit., p. ͩͫͪ–ͩͫͫ. The debate of this question was still alive at the beginning of the eighteenth 
century with Antonio Cordeyro SJ (ͩͮͬͨ–ͩͯͪͪ) defending the view of Hurtado and Arriaga, Cur-
sus philosophicus conimbricensis. Ulyssipone, Deslandensiana ͩͯͨͬ, p. ͯͪ–ͯͬ, (t. ͩ, d. ͫ,  q. ͪ, a. ͪ, 
n. ͫͪͭ-ͫͪ).
ͱͫ Arriaga, R., Cursus philosophicus … expurgatus, ͩͮͮͱ, op. cit., p. ͩͨͩͫ (d. ͯ, s. ͫ, sb. ͩ, n. ͪͱ).
ͱͬ “Ex his colligo, etiam per actus sensus interni, immo et externi, posse fi eri ens rationis: nam hi 
actus possunt falli, licet non in eo rigore, quo actus iudicii, ut dixi in Logica.” Ibid., p. ͩͨͩͫ (d. ͯ, 
s. ͫ, sb. ͩ, n. ͫͩ). 
ͱͭ Arriaga thinks of chimeras as individuals. Ibid., p. ͩͨͩͬ (d. ͯ, s. ͫ, sb. ͫ, n. ͬͪ). 
ͱͮ Ibid., p. ͩͨͩͬ (d. ͯ, s. ͫ, sb. ͫ, n. ͫͭ and ͫͰ). 
ͱͯ Ibid., p. ͩͨͩͫ (d. ͯ, s. ͫ, sb. ͩ, n. ͫͩ). 
ͱͰ Ibid., p. ͩͨͩͫ (d. ͯ, s. ͫ, sb. ͩ, n. ͫͩ). Suárez only reluctantly acknowledges causal contribution 
of human imagination: “Dicendum est enim neque in sensibus, neque in voluntate aut appetitu 
formari aut esse aliquo modo propria entia rationis [Disputationes metaphysicae, d. ͭͬ, s. ͪ, 
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make beings of reason Arriaga draws the conclusion that even animals can 
make them, e.g. when a sheep mistakenly thinks that there is a wolf. (Arriaga 
defends this undoubtedly provocative thesis at some length, adding a reply 
to John Punch and Francisco Oviedo in the revised edition). 
The simple apprehension 
In Arriaga’s view the simple apprehension makes beings of reason as well. 
 ose who disagree, he points out, do so because they think that beings of 
reason require conceiving the two as the one, and that the simple appre-
hension is incapable of doing this. But this argumentation is mistaken since 
what counts is not whether we express something by one or two terms, but 
whether the terms are joined by the copula. For instance, in the complex 
expression “Peter’s book” the terms “Peter” and “book” are not joined by 
“is”, which means that the object of this expression is grasped by our simple 
apprehension. And even simple essences can be expressed by two or more 
terms, e.g. “the rational animal”, and that does not make them complex. 
Hence even if we were not able to express beings of reason by simple terms, 
they could be made by the simple apprehension.
Appetites and the will 
 e common argument against the view that the will and the lower appe-
tite make beings of reason states that these faculties already presuppose the 
being of reason which is made up by the intellect. Arriaga does not fi nd this 
argument convincing and argues that even though appetites may tend to 
some apparent good (bonum apparens) based on the previous activity of the 
intellect that made the primary being of reason, they form their own being 
of reason, secondarily. It is, of course, awkward to call this item “a being of 
reason” – it would be more appropriate to speak of “beings of appetite” – but 
n. ͩͯ]. … Ab hac tamen generali regula excipi potest imaginatio humana, quae interdum fi ngit 
quaedam entia, quae revera nusquam sunt, vel etiam esse non possunt.” [Ibid., d. ͭ ͬ, s. ͪ , n. ͩ Ͱ.]
ͱͱ “nam brutum, v.g. ovis, non solum apprehendit lupum ut sic … sed illum apprehendit in tali loco 
… ergo apprehendit unionem talis loci cum lupo, hoc autem est [vel potest esse] falsum, ergo 
facit ens rationis. … Veritas haec mihi tam videtur certa, ut non possim nec de illa dubitare.” Ar-
riaga, R., Cursus philosophicus … expurgatus, ͩͮͮͱ, op. cit., p. ͩͨͩͫ (d. ͯ, s. ͫ, sb. ͪ, n. ͫͪ) Added 
paragraps in the revised edition are n. ͫͪ-ͫͬ.
ͩͨͨ For Hurtado’s views, see e.g. Novotný, D., Ens rationis, op. cit., p. ͩͩͰ. Hurtado denies the capa-
bility of the simple apprehension to make up beings of reason for the same reason he denies 
that of senses, namely that there is no truth or falsity in them.
ͩͨͩ Arriaga, R., Cursus philosophicus … expurgatus, ͩͮͮͱ, op. cit., p. ͩͨͩͭ (d. ͯ, sb. ͫ, n. ͬͨ-ͬͩ).
ͩͨͪ Ibid., p. ͩͨͩͭ (d. ͯ, sb. ͫ, n. ͬͫ-ͬͬ). 
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this problem and the entire question is only verbal and of minor importance, 
Arriaga states.
Arriaga’s views about the causes of beings of reason are remarkable for 
his emphasis on creativity of all human powers.  e previous scholastic 
tradition employed the term “being of reason” for something special and in 
the context of contemporary debates about nonexisting objects quite paro-
chial. For Suárez, for instance, a being of reason was an impossible inten-
tional object, for Hurtado a false proposition judged to be true, for Caramuel 
a self-contradictory expression. Only for Arriaga is a being of reason simply 
any nonexistent object that we might sense or think of. For him, unlike for 
Suárez or Hurtado, it was just a small step to formulate a contemporary 
form of the issue of nonexisting and fi ctitious objects, persons and worlds. 
Unfortunately, Arriaga did not take the step. Nevertheless, his section on the 
causes of beings of reason still seems to stand out as an original contribution 
within the scholastic context of the time. 
4. God: Does he know beings of reason? 
 e question whether God knows beings of reason is divided by Arriaga into 
two, namely, whether he knows them indirectly and whether in themselves. 
Does God know beings of reason indirectly? Arriaga fi rst reports that the 
view denying that God knows beings of reason as made by us is ascribed by 
Hurtado to Vázquez. Like Hurtado, he confesses diffi  culties understanding 
ͩͨͫ “An autem fi at ens rationis per actum appetitus et voluntatis … est quaestio de voce … 
[p. ͩͨͩͭ; d. ͯ, sb. ͫ, n. ͬͮ] … licet ens rationis non fi at primo a voluntate … fi t tamen quasi 
secundo, sicut iudicium facit suo modo ens rationis, licet etiam supponatur factum ab appre-
hensione.” Ibid., p. ͩͨͩͭ (d. ͯ, sb. ͫ, n. ͬͮ). 
ͩͨͬ His view approximates what is called today „creationism“ or „artifactualism“ according to 
which all fi ctional objects are „created“ by their authors. Other scholastic authors – by limiting 
beings of reason to self-contradictory, impossible objects – seem to assume what is called 
today „possibilism“ according to which the usual, contradiction-free fi ctional objects are pos-
sible (and creatable by God). For a brief overview of the contemporary debate, see Kroon, 
F. and Voltolini, A., Fiction. In: The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall ͮͬͭͭ Edition), Ed. 
E. Zalta. URL = <http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fallͪͨͩͩ/entries/fi ction/>. It is important to 
note, however, that the modern concept of literary fi ction, which seems (as a concept) to 
emerge in the nineteenth century, is quite diff erent from the scholastic concept of fi ction. One 
of the main characteristics of fi ction in the modern sense is that the question of truth or falsity 
in the real world does not even arise. We do not think that authors writing fi ction produce 
truths or falsehoods about the real world, they do not even intend to do so. See Rescher, N., 
Imagining Irreality: A Study of Unreal Possibilities. Chicago, Open Court ͪͨͨͫ, p. ͪͫͱ–ͪͭͮ.
ͩͨͭ For other Baroque views on the role of the imagination in the production of beings of reason, 
see Doyle, J. P., Beings of Reason and Imagination. In: On On the Borders of Being and Knowing 
Late Scholastic Theory of Supertranscendental Being, op. cit., p. ͩͭͩ–ͩͮͮ.
ͩͨͮ Arriaga’s reference to Hurtado’s textbook shows that he worked with the fi rst edition from 
ͩͮͩͭ, and not the revised one from ͩͮͪͬ. Hurtado’s views on this question, however, did not 
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how this view can be defended since, if God knows everything, including all 
human acts, some of which concern chimeras, then God knows them.	  is 
does not imply that he makes them up. Although God conceives what is not, 
i.e. beings of reason, he does not affi  rm their existence. Hence he does not 
make them up but rather destroys them.
 For in order to make something 
up it is not suffi  cient just to think of something impossible. It is also neces-
sary to affi  rm its existence. 
Does God know beings of reason in themselves? Arriaga’s answer is 
affi  rmative again. God knows, for instance, that the “rational horse is impos-
sible” and this he knows independently of humans. Hence he knows beings 
of reason in themselves.  is straightforward answer, however, seems to 
suggest that God is involved in some suspicious activity of making things up 
(fi ngere). Hence Arriaga emphasizes that one needs to distinguish two mean-
ings of “to make a being of reason”: in the sense of fi ngere (which presum-
ably amounts to making a mistake) and in the sense of dare esse cogni tum. It 
is the former, not the latter sense in which God makes beings of reason. In 
this sense even we can make beings of reason without being incriminated in 
making errors. 
In the revised edition Arriaga places at the beginning of the section 
a brief criticism of Bonne Espérance. According to him, God not just knows 
but makes beings of reason, for instance by thinking “ e fourth person of 
the Trinity is impossible” or “ e view ‘God does not exist’ is false.” Since 
thinking of the fourth person of the Trinity or of non-existent God is to 
make a being of reason, God is making beings of reason. Although Arriaga 
change. See Novotný, D., Ens rationis, op. cit., p. ͩͪͨ–ͩͪͪ. For Vázquez see his Commentariorum 
ac Disputationum, op. cit., p. ͭͰ (d. ͩͩͰ, c. ͬ).
ͩͨͯ Arriaga, R., Cursus philosophicus … expurgatus, ͩͮͮͱ, op. cit., p. ͩͨͩͮ (d. ͯ, s. ͬ, n. ͬͰ-ͭͨ). 
ͩͨͰ “Deus ergo, licet mente concipiat id quod non est, sive entia rationis, non tamen de eo affi  rmat 
esse, sed potius negat, unde non fi ngit sed destruit fi gmentum hominis.” Ibid., p. ͩͨͩͮ (d. ͯ, 
s. ͬ, n. ͭͩ). 
ͩͨͱ Ibid., p. ͩͨͩͮ (dͯsͬnͭͩ). Did Arriaga forget that in his view there are also possible beings of 
reason? He might say that in some sense even these are impossible when we include spacio-
temporal specifi cations. For instance, Peter’s running, while he is walking, is impossible here 
and now, although as such it is possible, cf. ibid., p. ͩͨͩͩ (d. ͯ, s. ͪ, n. ͩͱ).
ͩͩͨ Ibid., p. ͩͨͩͮ (d. ͯ, s. ͬ, n. ͭͪ). 
ͩͩͩ “Haec est quaestio de sola voce, de signifi catione scilicet verbi facere ens rationis; si enim 
facere dicatur idem quod fi ngere, certum est, a Deo non fi eri …: at si facere nihil aliud sonet 
quam dare illi esse cognitum, certum est a Deo fi eri. … nam dare esse obiective, nihil est aliud, 
quam dare illi cognosci.” Ibid., p. ͩͨͩͯ (d. ͯ, s. ͬ, n. ͭͭ).
ͩͩͪ See n. Ͱͯ. This is another claim from Arriaga that opens up modern perspectives on fi ctitious 
objects (see n. ͩͨͪ). We would not say of Gandalf that he is an error created by Tolkien. It is 
more plausible to say that Tolkien fi rst gave him esse cognitum (and then elaborated his de-
scription in many texts he wrote). Fictions are not real but they do not purport to be, hence 
they are not errors. 
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agrees with this claim, he does not want to allow its being expressed by the 
statement “God makes beings of reason”, because in its usual meaning the 
statement would imply that God makes false acts. 
In this section, unlike the previous, Arriaga’s arguments are derived 
mostly from Hurtado – apart from a brief and shallow criticism of Bonne 
Espé rance. His merely second-hand reference to Vázquez’s text indicates 
that he did want to spend much time on this topic.
5. Division: How many kinds of beings of reason are there?
Concerning the traditional division of beings of reason into the negation, 
the privation and the relation, Arriaga openly declares that it is insuffi  cient 
because it excludes impossible chimeras and possible (mistaken) non-exist-
ents such as “non-existent running affi  rmed as existing” (cursus non existens 
affi  rmatus existens). It is better to divide beings of reason into the impos-
sible (chimerical), and the possible. Both are then subdivided into as many 
genera as there are real beings, in fact even more as some genera can be 
made up.	 Negations and privations as they are in reality are not beings 
of reason.
  e rejection of the traditional division is perhaps a somewhat 
bold step against sententia communis. Neither Suárez nor Hurtado take 
it, although both are uncomfortable with the division.  ere is, however, 
ͩͩͫ Ibid., p. ͩͨͩͮ (d. ͯ, s. ͬ, n. ͬͰ). 
ͩͩͬ Arriaga briefl y returns to the question in his Disputationes theologicae, now pointing out to 
some interpretative diffi  culties with what Vázquez says (“dubie loquitur”) and discussing 
some interesting examples of beings of reason that God knows independently of humans, 
such as “Ens rationis est aliquid fi ctum ab intellectu repugnans existere” and “Si equus es-
set homo, esset rationalis.” Referring to the debate from Cursus philosophicus he says that 
“fuseque reieci aliquas Patris Vázquez solutiones”. (Disputationum theologicarum in Primam 
Partem … Tomi duo, editio novissima caeteris correctior, Sumpt. Laurentii Anisson, Lugduni, 
p. ͩͱͩ–ͩͱͪ). This is an overstatement not just with respect to what Arriaga says of Vázquez. 
The entire section is rather short and disappointing. We may contrast Arriaga’s few para-
graphs, for instance, with the long and subtle discussion of the Peruvian Ildefonso de Peñafi el 
SJ (ͩͭͱͬ–ͩͮͭͯ), Theologia scholastica naturalis … editio nova, tomus secundus, Sumpt. Joannis 
Antonii Huguetan, Lugduni ͩͮͯͰ, p. ͫͯ–ͯͰ. For Peñafi el, see Pretell García, M., La fi losofía de 
Idefonso de Peñafi el. In La complicada historia del pensamiento fi losófi co peruano, siglos XVII y 
XVIII. Ed. J. C. Ballón Vargas. Ediciones del Vicerrectorado Académico de la UNMSM, Lima ͪͨͩͩ, 
p. ͭͪͭ–ͭͯͪ.
ͩͩͭ Ibid., p. ͩͨͩͯ (d. ͯ, s. ͭ, n. ͭͯ). 
ͩͩͮ “Melius ergo primo potest dividi in ens rationis impossibile, seu chimaericum, ut v.g. equus 
rationalis, homo hinnibilis, alius Deus ab hoc, etc. et in ens rationis possibile, ut cursus Petri non 
existens, affi  rmatus tamen existens.” Ibid., p. ͩͨͩͯ (d. ͯ, s. ͭ, n. ͭͯ).
ͩͩͯ Ibid., p. ͩͨͩͯ (d. ͯ, s. ͭ, n. ͭͯ).
ͩͩͰ Adverte, negationem et privationem esse entia rationis, quando per modum formae iudican-
tur, alias vero sunt ante intellectum … de quo fusius in Physica. Ibid., p. ͩͨͩͯ (d. ͯ, s. ͭ, n. ͭͰ).
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nothing original nor creative in revising the division in light of previous 
considerations. 
Conclusion
As with other great Baroque authors the signifi cance of Arriaga’s theory of 
beings of reason is hard to assess as we need to take into consideration the 
complex web of explicit or implicit intertextual references. It seems clear at 
this point that although he tacitly presupposes the conceptual and meth-
odological background created by Suárez, it is clearly Hurtado’s work that 
he develops. However, he is by no means his slavish follower but introduces 
some important modifi cations whenever he can. His most interesting contri-
bution probably concerns the broadening of the concept of beings of reason, 
in that they are items made by the simple apprehension, not just by false 
judgments (contra Hurtado), and they can be imagined or perceived both 
by internal and external senses (contra everybody else). He also engages in 
various disputes, especially with Lynch and Bonne Espérance.  e debate 
with Lynch concerning the irreducibility of beings of reason to real beings 
was considered of such importance that Caramuel carefully analyses it 
twelve years later in his Leptotatos. Arriaga’s other distinctive views and 
arguments were discussed by later scholastics, but seem to have found 
hardly any followers. 
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SUMMARY
In 1632 Rodrigo de Arriaga, an important Baroque scholastic thinker, published a 
textbook in philosophy, of which the last revised and extended edition was published 
in 1669. Arriaga develops in it a peculiar theory of beings of reason, drawing on Pe-
dro Hurtado de Mendoza, according to which beings of reason are that which is ex-
pressed by false judgments. It is a theory quite diff erent from the classical theories 
held by Francisco Suárez, the  omists and the majority of Scotists on the one hand, 
and reductive theories held by Richard Lynch and a growing number of later Baroque 
authors on the other. In this paper I analyse Arriaga’s theory and deal with the topics 
of nature, existence, causes, and division of beings of reason. 
Keywords: Rodrigo de Arriaga, beings of reason, Richard Lynch, François de Bonne 
Espérance (Franciscus Bonae Spei)
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